When the Soviet Union collapsed and Russia reduced the size of its strategic forces, these “requirements” were reduced, but still remained fairly high as the basic target set and criteria for their destruction was not changed very much. Still, the wide range of targets and the insistence on high confidence in their destruction (meaning multiple strikes were required on high value targets) led to “requirements” for high numbers of weapons ready to be launched, and even larger numbers in the US arsenal to support those on alert. In fact, the US planned to strike while under attack or even upon warning of an imminent attack. During the latter stages of the Cold War, US policy hypothesized that to deter the Soviet Union, US nuclear forces should be able, with high confidence, to survive an attack and retaliate with devastating consequences against the Soviet military and civilian leadership, remaining nuclear forces, conventional military forces, and supporting war industries. So-called “requirements” for effective nuclear deterrence are based strictly on theories and speculation. The answer to this question is not obvious, and can never be certain, given that, fortunately, there is no empirical evidence - nor anyway to acquire it. Given that only Russia has a nuclear arsenal of a size comparable to that of the US, in effect, the question is what is required to deter a Russian nuclear attack. In the summer of 2011, the Administration launched what was supposed to be a 90-day “NPR Implementation Study (NPRIS).” The key question to be answered was how many nuclear weapons of what types are required to ensure that the primary purpose of these weapons - to deter nuclear attacks on the US, its forces abroad, and its allies - could be carried out successfully. The Administration has not yet accomplished this the challenge is to bring about real and lasting positive changes in the country’s nuclear posture. Real changes can only be accomplished when new, detailed guidance is provided to the government agencies and individuals that, among other things, plan for nuclear contingencies, make decisions on budgets for nuclear weapons and the infrastructure that supports them, and conduct negotiations with other nations about limits on nuclear forces. Policy statements alone, although important to convey signals to domestic and foreign audiences, do not result in concrete changes to the nation’s nuclear forces. The key decision resulting from this “Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)” was to narrow the declared roles of nuclear weapons in US strategy. In April 2010, the Obama Administration completed an inter-agency study of the nation’s policies governing nuclear weapons. Click here to view the complete Presidential Inbox series.
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